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By David Hearne, Researcher, Centre for Brexit Studies 
Michael Gove’s now infamous comment, that “the people in this 
country have had enough of experts”[1] attracted widespread 
incredulity amongst many and a degree of ridicule from some. 
Nevertheless, the comment clearly hit a nerve amongst many. 
Perhaps ironically for someone who might be termed a ‘Brexpert’, I 
have some sympathy with this. I have experienced first-hand the 
frustration that goes with being told, “I don’t believe you, because 
you’re an economist”. Nevertheless, this is not a paean to ‘experts’, 
far from it. 
I argue that we shouldn’t conflate the rather modern conception of the 
‘expert’, able to offer informed commentary, with the possession of 
genuine (deep) expertise. This problem is particularly acute in my own 
field: there is a reason why economists are almost unique in the level 
of disdain we attract. As such, dismissing the prognostications of 
academic economists during (and after) the 2016 EU referendum was 
unusually easy. 
Part of the issue is that whereas the use of particular titles (e.g. the 
term doctor) is regulated, the same is not true of the term ‘economist’. 
To see the importance of this, consider the difference in the use of the 
term ‘engineer’ between the UK and Germany. In the latter, the title 
engineer is restricted to those individuals who have had certain 
training. In the UK, in contrast, the term ‘engineer’ applies equally to 
civil engineer and a heating engineer. Yet, whilst both are valuable 
roles they are fundamentally very different. The type and amount of 
training required for each differs vastly. 
The same is true of the title ‘economist’. The label applies equally to 
an academic who has won the Riksbank Prize (colloquially known as 
the Nobel Prize in Economics) and someone who works in the City. 
Whilst many of the latter are undoubtedly highly intelligent and might 
be extremely well paid, most will lack the training undergone by the 
former (and almost certainly the effective ‘ongoing professional 
development’ required in order to publish at the cutting edge of the 
field). 
This is not a criticism – the two are different roles and require different 
skill sets (and mind sets!) The upshot is that our use of terminology 
has played a contributory role in undermining the reputation of 
academic expertise in the field of economics. The second important 
element of this is that, like many academic fields, the domain of 
economics is very broad. Whilst we all have a certain base level of 
training, our specialisms and areas of expertise differ notably. 
Economics is not unique in this regard. Just as you would not expect 
a gynaecologist to moonlight as a heart surgeon, so it is not 
reasonable to expect an industrial organisation specialist to know the 
cutting edge of the literature on exchange rate movements. By the 
same token, I have limited knowledge regarding Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) modelling but one of my colleagues has deep 
expertise in the area (it being his specialism). 
Thus, whilst it is easy to point at economists and ask why no-one 
predicted the ‘Great Recession’ of 2008, it’s worth pointing out that 
this is only relevant to certain branches of the discipline. It would 
hardly be fair to suggest that a crisis in finance means that auction 
theory is a failure. Indeed, auction theory is one of the great success 
stories of modern economics: it underpins Google’s Adwords and 
informed the UK government’s hugely successful auction of the 3G 
spectrum back in 2000, which raised a massive £22.5bn for the 
exchequer. 
Even in the domain of applied macroeconomics, I remember being an 
undergraduate in a guest lecture in 2006, during which Professor 
Charles Goodhart expressed concern at the absence of appropriate 
modelling of the financial sector in macroeconomics. In other words, 
even though nobody knew what was to come, there were clear 
concerns amongst {Santos Silva, 2006 #18@@author-year}leaders in 
the field about the state of our understanding. 
In contrast, the gravity equation – on which much modelling of trade 
(including with reference to Brexit) is based – is one of the most stable 
empirical regularities in the whole of economics. As ever, however, 
the specifics of the model[2] and estimation procedure[3] matter a 
great deal. The output of CGE models of the potential impact of Brexit 
depend crucially on the assumptions of the model. These are typically 
grounded in economic theory and so the model output is dependent 
on the theoretical underpinnings. 
Finally, one issue that economics shares with other disciplines is the 
difficulty of communicating uncertainty to the public. People typically 
want answers, but we don’t have them – at least not in an easily 
digestible form. People want specific numbers, but all any of us can 
do is give a range of outcomes (a Bayesian would point out that I’m 
effectively giving a probability distribution of parameter estimates!) 
Worse, the desire to give “a number” leads to spurious accuracy, and 
an inevitable backlash when the outcome is different to that number. If 
someone tells you that a “no deal” Brexit will cause the economy to 
shrink by 3%, it is almost certain that this is not actually what they 
mean. It might mean that the model being used suggests that “on 
average” the economy will be 3% smaller in 15 years than it would 
have been had the UK remained in the EU. It doesn’t mean that the 
economy will shrink, but it does imply that we will not be as well off as 
we might be. Most reputable organisations will give some kind of 
confidence interval around estimates (e.g. from 2% to 4%), but even 
these are typically too narrow given model uncertainty. 
The same phenomenon is visible in opinion polling. Like economists, 
opinion polls are typically excoriated for giving the “wrong” answer. 
Yet as opinion polls conduct samples, all they can ever tell you is that 
the likely range of outcomes will be within a range of values. As in 
economics, the confidence interval given will always be too narrow. 
Some voters will change their minds (notice that “don’t knows” and 
refusals always represent a significant part of any sample) and it is 
notoriously difficult to properly weight a sample. The upshot is that 
opinion polls are not “wrong” in the conventional sense, simply 
misinterpreted. 
Another excellent example of the same phenomenon is climate 
science. There is huge uncertainty over the evolution of the climate 
over the next century and the precise magnitude of any temperature 
rise that a 100ppm rise in CO2 levels would engender (and over what 
time period). Nevertheless, there is broad agreement that a 
substantial rise in CO2 will lead to a rise in temperature. As in climate 
science, there are outliers – it is almost always possible to find 
examples that buck the trend. 
The same is true of Brexit. All of us face pressure to be “experts” and 
give easily digested information. This pressure is difficult to resist, 
particularly when communicating the complexities of our work is 
challenging. There is considerable uncertainty over the magnitude of 
any impact and the time period over which that might play out. We 
can, however, have reasonable confidence in its overall direction, at 
least relative to where we would be in a hypothetical universe in which 
the UK had remained part of the EU. This is the value of expertise. 
[1] https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-
abc22d5d108c 
[2] See: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/Meta2.pdf and http://fa
culty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/Glick2.pdf 
[3] https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/rest.88.4.641 
 
